

































































THE THrEE VErSionS of THE 
UlTimATUm GAmE: An ExAmPlE 
from THE HiSTory of CrEATion 
of THE KinGDom of SErbS, 
CroATS AnD SloVEnES 1914-1918
Abstract We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian 
Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs 
from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical 
(rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with 
any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game 
theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction 
in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe 
this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the 
leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum 
game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who 
opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum 
to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was 
harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces 
two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Sec-
ond, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt 
themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is diffi-
cult to simulate in experiments.
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The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formally created on 1st December 
1918. The creation was preceded by long negotiations that lasted for several years 
during World War I. The two main agents that took part in these negotiations – the 
Yugoslav Committee that claimed to represent the South Slavs from the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the Serbian Government led by Nikola Pašić – several times faced a 
breakdown in negotiations, which could have led to entirely different outcomes. We 
investigate the negotiation process from the perspective of game theory, claiming 
that the negotiation had at least three phases, each of which exemplifies a distinctive 
version of the ultimatum game. The product (the Kingdom that was created) was the 
outcome of a mixture of all these three phases and could easily have been different.
Our study applies game theory to a historical process and uses history to pro-
vide a narrative for a subvariant of a game, thereby making it an interdisciplinary 
work. We claim that – in addition to the behavioral game theory that claims that 
receivers can be emotional – proposers can also behave irrationally at the cost of 
themselves.
This is not the first time that game theory has been applied to Yugoslav history 
(see Gligorov, 1994).1 Nevertheless, our paper may raise some eyebrows inside the 
academic community that studies the history of the South Slavs and Yugoslav history, 
which is why we want to begin this introduction with a methodological note.
The paper offers several novelties relevant for both game theory and Yugoslav 
history. First, we extend the ultimatum game to a new theoretical model (subva-
riant) in which the proposer (rather than the receiver) can act emotionally. Second, 
we offer a historical (non-economic) narrative for the ultimatum game. A narrative 
is a critical element for game theory models, for only with a narrative can it be 
known if the model is applicable to the real world (Morgan, 2014; Grüne‐Yanoff, 
and Schweinzer, 2008). Not only can the ultimatum game be applied to and explain 
a historical situation, but the historical situation discussed here provides empirical 
material for all its three variants. We know now that the ultimatum game can have 
several subvariants, each of which has its own equilibrium, but we cannot know 
which one will be selected. To find out about it, we must have a narrative at hand 
because only a "narrative prepares the ground for the 'solution of the game" i.e., 
the identification of equilibrium strategy profiles, by applying the theory proper to 
the game structure" (Grüne-Yanoff & Schweinzer, 2008: 137). Braudel believed that 
economists must count on historians to formulate explanations about economic 
progress (1982: 86). Game theorist should do the same vis-à-vis their explanations.
The analysis and the narrative we offer here is obviously beneficial for game the-
ory. Is our analysis beneficial for historiography? We draw on the work of Fernand 
Braudel, who claimed that "all the social sciences infect each other, and history is 
just as much a prey to these epidemics as any of the others. Whence come its changes 
in function, or method, or appearance" (1982: 65). Braudel claimed that historians 
have "wanted to be, and [have] become, an economist, sociologist, anthropologist, 
demographer, psychologist, linguist" (1982: 68). Can they be game theorists? We be-
lieve they can. Therefore, rather than buying into the argument that historiography 
is a mere collection of facts and events which happen only once, we see history as the 
outcome of a family of patterns that can be observed in different times and different 
1 It has been applied to post-Yugoslav history. See Whitt and Wilson, 2007: 655-668; Stojanović, 


































































places.2 Apart from Braudel, such approach in the historiography was embraced by 
Lucien Febvre(Fevr, 2004), and among some Balkan historians (Stojanović, 2008; 
2010).
Granted, history often has served as an empirical material for "non-historic" 
disciplines, but the benefit was mutual. Consider Theda Skocpol's States and So-
cial Revolutions (1979) or Acemoglu and Robinson's Why Nations Fail (2012). Both 
studies are full of historical examples to which a certain theoretical model, which 
has excess explanatory power, was applied (Elster, 2015). The authors tried to find 
a more general framework with which it would be possible to explain when revo-
lutions occur or why some nations are wealthier than others. Today's comparative 
politics and political economy have obviously benefitted from such analyses, but can 
anyone rightfully deny that historical scholarship on France, Russia, or China do not 
benefit from Skocpol's or Acemoglu and Robinson's studies? After such studies are 
done, the history of these societies and certain processes and outcomes are better 
understood. Therefore, our article sheds additional and informative light on the pro-
cess of the negotiations that led to the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918.3 Although the-
se negotiations took place only once and are unrepeatable, we believe that our study 
offers two novelties for the historiography of the first Yugoslavia and historiography 
in general. First, our work shows how complex the negotiations were and why it is 
right to think that several different outcomes were possible. Second, our explanati-
on offers excess explanatory power and can be deployed to explain other historical 
events and processes that are about state creation by means of negotiations. We ela-
borate on the second contribution in the concluding section.
Finally, by introducing emotions in the analysis, we contribute to the discipline 
of history emotions (Frevert, 2011).
The remainder of the article is structured in the following way: Sections 2 and 3 
discuss the rational choice and the two behavioral versions of the ultimatum game; 
Sections 4–6 provide the narrative for all three versions of the ultimatum game; and 
Section 7 offers the conclusion.
2. Rational Choice Game Theory
The general form of the ultimatum game, introduced in game theory by Werner 
Güth, is as follows (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). Suppose there are 
two players, the Proposer (P) and the Receiver (R), who have to split a fixed sum 
of money, say, ten dollars. The minimal split unit is one dollar. The Proposer plays 
first by offering a distribution in the form of (10-x, x). For example, if x=2, the dis-
tribution is (8, 2), meaning that P gets eighty per cent, and R twenty per cent of the 
sum. P can split it any way it wants, but R decides whether to accept x or not. If R 
accepts x, the outcome of the game is (10-x, x). If, however, R (for whatever reason) 
turns down the offer, the outcome is (0, 0). By comparing outcome payoffs for both 
players, we can see that the acceptance outcome is a Pareto improvement on the 
rejection outcome.
The game can be presented in the extensive form (Figure 1):
2 See Braudel's discussion on the battle of Pavia or the battle of Rocroi from 1525 and 1643, 
respectively (1982: 67).
3 The state was declared on December 1st, 1918, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 

























What is the equilibrium outcome of this game? Analytical and behavioral game 
theory offers different answers to this question (Camerer, 2003). The rational choice 
explanation states that P can propose any split as long as x>0. R will accept the offer 
because something is always better than nothing. This conclusion is grounded in 
a standard microeconomic presumption on human behavior according to which 
more is always better than less (Frank, 2008: 64-66). Suppose x=$1. Rational choice 
theory suggests that R will accept one dollar only because this is better than nothing. 
Anticipating this, P may propose a rather unfair distribution, which favors her and 
puts R at a relative disadvantage. The conclusion is as follows. If x>$0.00, the equili-
brium outcome will be any proposal made by P, because R always needs something 
rather than nothing. What will P do if they know this? They will offer x that has 
smallest value. An offer of one dollar will therefore be the equilibrium outcome.
However, the experiments done in behavioral game theory did not endorse such 
a conclusion (Camerer, 2003). They showed that when x is very low, receivers tend 
to reject offers. For instance, when x drops to twenty per cent of the initial sum, 
fifty per cent of the receivers reject the offer; when it drops to ten per cent, the reje-
ction rate is even higher. The researchers found that receivers react emotionally to 
unfair offers and are able to turn them down even if the payoff of zero worsens the-
ir situations. Anticipating this, proposers increase x and offer somewhere between 
sixty:forty, or even the fifty:fifty split (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Houser 
and McCabe, 2014: 28). Similar results were obtained in experiments in which the 
stake was higher, when the respondents had to split hundred dollars rather than 
only ten dollars. Some receivers reject offers that were twenty or even thirty per cent 
of the split was up to four hundred dollars (List and Cherry, 2000).
3. Behavioral Game Theory Response
The behavioral findings can hardly be explained by conventional microeconomic 
assumptions about rational behavior under which rational individuals should ac-









Figure 1.  


































































as a form of justice, thus accepting them only if they are squared with their sense of 
justice (Rawls, 1971). If R believes that x is too low, or that the offer is unfair, they 
will reject it to get even with P, drawing on the principle of negative reciprocity (Ca-
merer, 2003: 10). R will do it at their own cost (it will not receive x>0). Material loss 
will be compensated by the fact that P suffered some loss too, which will generate 
pleasure in R. Due to this emotional reaction, the outcome of the game will be diffe-
rent from what the rational choice theory predicts.
More detailed explanations on why unfair proposals are rejected come from 
neuroeconomics (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). A sense of justice is critical for un-
derstanding this outcome because it triggers emotional reactions to unfair offers 
(Marshall, 1972: 789-790). When facing an unfair offer, the brain triggers chemical 
reactions that create emotions that impact the decision-making mechanism to reject 
an unfair offer. The need to express such emotions motivates people to turn down 
offensive proposals even if they would incur material loss (Xiao and Houser, 2005: 
7398-7401). These findings converge on other research, which found that unfair 
offers activate certain brain areas such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dIPFC), both of which regulate emotions (Sanfey et 
al., 2003: 1755-1758).
3.1 Can Proposer be Emotional too?
What goes for Receiver goes for Proposer, too. The latter can also exert an emotional 
reaction to the receiver's prior behavior or to their status. P, after having offered a 
split, may believe that R does not deserve a better offer, or that R is not worthy of 
anything better. This may be influenced by ideological beliefs. Maybe P wants to take 
revenge on R for something R did in the past, believes that R owes them something, 
or believes they are entitled to something R does not deserve and never will. Previo-
us events may thus determine P's emotions when they offer an ultimatum. The offer 
can be highly unacceptable for R, and yet if R rejects it, P will not reconsider and will 
end negotiations at the cost of themselves, which goes against rational choice theory 
predictions described above. In other words, a history of relations may make P insist 
on unfair or humiliating offers.
The experimental discussions on the ultimatum game do not capture this aspect 
because a history of relations is difficult to simulate in experiments. In other words, 
R's emotional reaction is endogenous. It is generated by the offer itself. In contrast, 
P's emotional reaction is exogenous. It may be generated by some previous event(s), 
which happened before the split or negotiations. Yet it may have high impact on the 
outcome of the game.
The above discussion about R's reaction means that the ultimatum game works 
by way of a mechanism. A mechanism is a frequently occurring and recognizable 
causal pattern with indeterminate consequences (Elster, 2015). One cause can result 
in two totally opposing outcomes. As argued, R can respond in two divergent ways: 
R can accept the offer because something is better than nothing, but R can also reject 
it because it is unfair. But we want to claim more. P's initial offer may be understood 
as a mechanism, too. On the one hand, anticipating an emotional response from R, 
P may propose a rather unfair but also fair distribution, which would support the 
standard microeconomic assumption – that P will rationally evaluate the situation 

























other than rational beliefs,4 be convinced that they are right in offering whatever to 
R. In which case, P will disregard R's reaction and go ahead with an unfair offer, even 
if the breakdown of negotiations as a consequence of such a staunch strategy may 
be costly for P. Our major argument is this: P may give an unfair offer not because 
they rely on the microeconomic assumption that R has to accept it as long as x>0, 
but rather because P is convinced that they have some sort of moral right to frame 
both the negotiations and the content of the offer.
3.2 The Historical Example
We test these different behavioral assumptions of the ultimatum game by looking 
into the negotiation talks about the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (also known as the first Yugoslavia) in 1914-1918. The negotiations were 
conducted between the Serbian government (P) and the Yugoslav Committee (R), 
within the context of World War I, which brought about the collapse of the Habs-
burg Monarchy that had contained territories of today's Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, including the popu-
lations of ethnic Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. The eventual preference of the majority 
of the Serb, Croat and Slovene politicians from Austria-Hungary was to unite or to 
make some sort of alliance with the Kingdom of Serbia, given the opportunity pros-
pectively created by the war and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy.
The Yugoslav Committee (R) was a group of seventeen outstanding Croatian, 
Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals and politicians who fled the Habsburg Monar-
chy at the outset of the war and started to propagate the creation of an independent 
South Slavic state. Although the Committee had no official mandate to represent 
the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary, they were tacitly supported by the majority of 
the Croatian and the Serb politicians who stayed in the Monarchy and maintained 
secret ties with the Committee (Banac, 1992: 125; Meštrović, 1993: 42, 45-46, 87-
89). That enabled the Committee to claim to represent around 6 million Slav pe-
ople, who lived there at the time (This was over eleven per cent of the Monarchy's 
total population in 1914.). Even the Slovenian politicians and the minor faction of 
Croatian politicians who exclusively sought the autonomy of the South Slavs within 
the Habsburg Monarchy gradually embraced the unification with Serbia by the co-
urse of 1917 and 1918 (Cornwall, 2011). However, since the politicians who stayed 
in the Monarchy did not participate in the negotiations, they are not analyzed in 
this paper.
The chief Serbian government negotiator was Serbian Premier Nikola Pašić (P). 
He himself behaved rather differently depending on the phases of negotiations as 
well as the phases of the ongoing war (the negotiations took place during World 
War I). At some point he was accommodating and was prepared to adapt the Ser-
bian offer to the Yugoslav Committee, thus confirming the rational choice theory 
assumptions. At times, by contrast, he was rather hawkish, arguing that the Ha-
bsburg South Slavs might unite with the Serbian Kingdom exclusively under the 
Serbian terms. This strategy was risky and implied a high cost for Serbia because 
such a staunch insistence on the Serbian proposal could have left Serbia without new 
territories and with a significant part of the Serbian people outside Serbia when the 
war was over (some part of the Habsburg Monarchy was guaranteed to the Serbian 



































































Kingdom by the 1915 Treaty of London). We, therefore, could designate the mode-
rate Pašić with P1 and the hawkish Pašić with P2 (sections four and five).5
The goal of the Yugoslav Committee was to unite with the Serbian Kingdom but 
it had its own ideas about how it should be done. As opposed to the Serbian dele-
gation that represented a sovereign state, the Yugoslav Committee represented the 
three ethnic but non-sovereign groups that lived under a sovereign authority of the 
Austria-Hungarian Monarchy. At the very end of the war, R was represented by the 
National Council from the Habsburg Monarchy (section six). R, therefore, can be 
broken down into three different agent types with different responses to the Serbian 
offer. Granted, the majority of the Committee members were prepared to accept any 
kind of offer for the unification coming from the Serbian government because 'so-
mething is better than nothing'. We will call these agents type R1 as they conform to 
the typical microeconomic assumption. In contrast, one member of the Committee, 
Croat Frano Supilo, behaved hawkishly and in agreement with the behavioral game 
theory's predictions. He insisted on a much broader autonomy for Croats within the 
new state (which would be created on 1st December 1918), and was ready to reject 
the offer if it did not contain such an autonomy. Frano Supilo is thus R2.
In the third variant of the game (discussed in section six), a new P appears too, 
thus replacing Nikola Pašić and his cabinet. P is represented by the Prince-Regent 
Aleksandar Karađorđević, the son of the Serbian King Petar Karađorđević (Petar 
was still alive at the time, but since he was old, he transferred most of the King's 
duties to his son, some of which was the military command during the war as well 
as participation in the negotiations.).
Based on this designation, we differentiate among three versions of the ultima-
tum game that took place during the negotiations between the Serbian government 
and the Yugoslav Committee in 1914-1918.
1) Rational Choice Version. This version has a 'take it or leave it' form with typical 
P and R as the main agents.
2) Behavioral Version One (with emotional R). R2 was prepared to reject unificati-
on (thus risking an uncertain future) if the offer was not fair.
3) Behavioral Version Two (with emotional P). P2 was ready to give a humiliating 
offer and risk a breakdown of negotiations, getting less for themselves than they 
could have had by following the rational choice assumptions if R did not accept 
whatever was offered.
The third version is most interesting because P2's emotional reaction was a pro-
duct of moral superiority embraced by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić who 
5 The same circumstances that transpired for the South Slavic politicians in Austria-Hungary 
also occurred in the Kingdom of Montenegro. Ivo Banac stated that "the tradition of Monte-
negrin self-centredness did not, however, prevent reciprocity with the Serbians…the Serb tra-
dition percolated down to the consciousness of the most ordinary herdsmen" (Banac, 1992: 
274). Serbia saw unification with Montenegro as an issue separate from the goal of South Slav 
unification and one that should be achieved in any case. That is the reason why Pašić excluded 
Montenegro from the negotiations from the very beginning. The Committee consented to 
Pašić's view that Montenegro had been "internal matter of Serbdom". Eventually in early 1916, 
the faction in Montenegrin politics that supported unconditional unification with Serbia took 
the leading posts in the Montenegrin government, so the question of Montenegro's independ-


























believed the Serbs from Serbia and the Habsburg South Slavs were the same people, 
but he was unprepared to give the Yugoslav Committee an equal status as negotia-
tors. More importantly, he was unprepared to grant the South Slavs from the Habs-
burg Monarchy equal status in the new state. The offer Pašić gave as P2 was that the 
new state would be created only under the Serbian dominant leadership – namely, 
under the Serbian dynasty of Karađorđević and the 1903 Serbian constitution, whi-
ch is what eventually happened in 1918 and 1921, respectively. Some Serbs believed 
that any different offer would not reflect the sacrifice of the Serbian state and the 
army during World War I, which was still ongoing when the negotiations began.
3.3 Hawkish Negotiators
We claim that at some point during the war the Serbian offer had a 'take it or leave it' 
form, which involved a significant risk for the Serbian government given the context 
in which it had an opportunity to obtain a large chunk of the Habsburg Monarchy's 
territory and include its South Slavic populations under its sovereignty. This happe-
ned in 1917, while the Serbian army and government were in Greece in exile. The 
talks between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee took place un-
der the sponsorship of Great Britain and France on the Greek island of Corfu (part 
of the Ionian islands). The outcome of the talks is known as the Corfu Declaration 
(signed on 20 July 1917). The Corfu offer was such that if R rejected it, P2 would not 
engage in another round of negotiations to adapt it to the new circumstances (as the 
rational choice theory predicts).
This most extreme form of negotiations, which involves the interaction of P2 
and R2, implies that R2's rejection leads to a suboptimal outcome for both players, 
while the acceptance outcome has to be a Pareto improvement on the rejection out-
come. The game can be presented in the extensive form (Figure 2):
 
Figure 2.  


































































In this version, R's rejection does not leave both players with nothing (like in 
the classical version presented in Figure 1), but this outcome is still worse for both 
than the outcome offered by P. If P's offer (8, 2) is accepted, both players can improve 
their positions compared to the rejection outcome (3, 1). The payoff of 3 reflects the 
fact that Serbia would not remain with nothing (as in the classical example) since 
a part of the Habsburg Monarchy's territory was promised to Serbia anyhow under 
the 1915 Treaty of London. The payoff of 1 reflects the fact that if they did not beco-
me part of the new state, the Habsburg South Slavs would be divided among Italy, 
Serbia and Hungary with a significant loss of the territory, which was in their mind 
far worse than being in one state (the payoff of 2, if they accept the offer).
In the next sections we supply empirical material for all three versions of the 
ultimatum game. Since we must respect the historical unfolding of events, we have 
slightly changed the conceptual order we introduced in the previous paragraph. 
Thus, we will begin with behavioral games and finish up with the section on rational 
choice version:
– Behavioral Version One (1914-1916)
– Behavioral Version Two (1917)
– Rational Choice Version (1918)
4. Behavioral Version One: P and R2 (1914-1916)
The idea that culminated in the wartime process of unification of the South Slavs 
into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 was formulated in the first 
years of the twentieth century. The expansion of German and Hungarian nationali-
sms by the late nineteenth century gave rise to the turn-of-the century renaissance 
of the Yugoslav idea in Croatian politics. The new generation of Croat and Serb poli-
ticians from Austria-Hungary (we employ this term alternatively with the Habsburg 
Monarchy), led by Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo (both ethnic Croats), founded 
the Croat-Serb Coalition that fell upon the idea of 'Croat-Serb national oneness' 
(narodno jedinstvo), meaning that Croats and Serbs, as ethnically close nations, sho-
uld cooperate tightly in order to improve their political status in Austria-Hungary 
(Banac, 1992: 97-98).6 Although the Yugoslav idea was traditionally loyal to the 
Habsburg dynasty, the Emperor Francis Joseph, constrained by the dualist system, 
refused to support the Coalition's early appeals to protect Croatia from Hungarian 
authorities. The Emperor's distancing from the Coalition directed its leaders away 
from thinking of the Habsburgs as a possible ally in solving Croatia's problems with 
the Hungarian government. Simultaneously, Serbia started to advocate for the libe-
ration of Serbs and other South Slavs in the Monarchy and for their unification with 
Serbia. These policy, in turn, made Austria-Hungary highly concerned about the 
prospects of a strong Serbia under Russian patronage, which would act as a magnet 
for the Monarchy's South Slav population. Consecutively, the Austro-Hungarian au-
thorities tried to restrain the policy of the Croat-Serb Coalition, which in turn just 
additionally strengthened the antagonism between the Coalition and the Hungarian 
leadership in Budapest and eventually towards the authority of the Emperor Fran-
cis Joseph (Beller, 2018: 228-238). Ultimately, the Habsburg's shortsighted policy 
pushed the many proponents of the Croat-Serb national oneness policy to embrace 
6 For the turn-of-the century renaissance of the Yugoslav idea in Croatian politics see Lovrenčić 
(1972), which still offers the most comprehensive insight in the topic. For Trumbić and Supilo, 

























Serbia as the 'Piedmont of the South Slavs' on the eve of the World War I, especially 
since Serbia's victories in the Balkan Wars raised a hopes about prospective forthco-
ming unification of the South Slavs.7
However, the Croatian proponents of the national oneness idea and Serbia's 
leading politicians embraced a quite different vision of the future state. While the 
Croatian politicians imagined a future joint state as a federal union where all the 
South Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary should center on Croatia, the Serbian 
politicians envisioned the highly centralized state that would, above all, accomplish 
the Serb unification (Banac, 1992: 115-117). The notion of Serbia as 'Piedmont of 
South Slavs' was also grounded in the notion of the superiority of the Serb culture 
and tradition in respect to the Croatian and Slovenian cultures and traditions. The 
notion of the Serb superiority was derived from the history of the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth century Serbian wars for liberation, in the Slavophile notion of Orthodox 
superiority, as well in the legacy of alleged modern Serbia's democratic constitution. 
Consecutively, the Croatian and the Slovenian culture and tradition were seen less 
national and dynamic due to a high presence of elements of foreign culture, inclu-
ding the Catholic religion and obsolete Croatian feudal state tradition. The notion 
of Serb superiority and respective Croatian and Slovene inferiority were also highly 
embraced on the eve of the war by the Croatian youth of Yugoslav orientation, as 
well as by some Croatian politicians of Yugoslav orientation (Banac, 1992: 98-112, 
153-169; Gross, 1968-69).
At the outbreak of World War I, some of the most outstanding South Slav poli-
ticians (mainly Croats and Serbs) of the pro-Yugoslav orientation fled the Monarchy 
and escaped to Italy, where they formed what in mid-1915 became the Yugoslav 
Committee. The Committee was constituted with the purpose of representing the 
Austro-Hungarian South Slavs and of advocating the formation of an independent 
South Slavic state. From the outset, the Committee found itself in a disadvantageous 
position since the war aims of the Entente governments did not include the disso-
lution of Austria-Hungary. Russia, as well England and France, aimed to preserve 
(a reduced) Habsburg Monarchy. Although Russia supported the territorial expan-
sion of Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary, it was simultaneously afraid of 
the prospective repercussions that the emancipation of the nations in the Monarchy 
could have on Russia. Thus, the Czarist government opposed the creation of a lar-
ger South Slavic state. While the French and the English governments were prone 
to consider the interests of the Austro-Hungarian small nations, they were simul-
taneously dedicated to saving (a reduced) Austria-Hungary as a means to prevent 
the expansion of the German and Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Šepić, 1970: 14-15).
Subsequently the Committee came to be in an even more disadvantageous posi-
tion when the Entente powers in April 1915 concluded the Secret Treaty of London 
with Italy, which promised the latter the extensive part of the east coast of the Adria-
tic Sea in exchange for a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary (Šepić, 1970: 113).
The fact that the London treaty handed over thousands of Croats and Slovenes 
to Italy pushed the Yugoslav Committee to become completely dependent on Ser-
bia's war efforts (Šepić, 1970: 131), thus placing the Committee in the position of 
7 On how the repressive policy exercised by the Austrian Authorities in the south Slavic terri-
tories in the eve of the War gradually derogated the trust in the Monarchy in the eyes of the 


































































classical Receiver (R) from rational choice game model. Simultaneously, the Treaty 
of London promised Serbia the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina 
and eventually the chunk of the east coast of the Adriatic Sea, thus putting Serbia 
in the position of Proposer (P) in the rational choice game model.8 However, the 
situation was not so plain and simple, and was changed significantly by the war's 
ups and downs.
The Serbian government officially declared on 7th December 1914 'the struggle 
for liberation and the unification of all our unfree brothers of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes' to be Serbia's main war objective (Šišić, 1920: 10). Furthermore, declaring 
the South Slav unification as Serbia's official war aim was to break initial suspicions 
of the leaders of the South Slavic emigres, Croats Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo, 
in the eventual goals of the Serbian policy. Thus, the Declaration of the Serbian 
government from December 1914 created enthusiasm by Trumbić and Supilo on 
how "Serbia embraced officially our ideas" (Šepić, 1958: 277-279). According to wor-
ld-famous member of the Yugoslav Committee Ivan Meštrović, by the end of 1914 
Trumbić and Supilo were ready to embrace the "unconditional unity with Serbia at 
any cost" (Meštrović, 1993: 49).
However, R did not behave entirely according to the rational choice model. Na-
mely, the Yugoslav Committee rejected to act as the kind of the agency of the Pa-
šić cabinet. Namely, Pašić was trying to convince the South Slav emigrees that the 
South Slav unification could eventually be achieved only if the Committee entirely 
followed the policy of Serbia as an internationally recognized state and the Entente 
member. Moreover, Pašić claimed that the Committee's action independent of Ser-
bia's policy could only jeopardize their common war aim due to the English, French 
and Russian plan to preserve Austria-Hungary (Dragnich, 1974: 114).
The Committee's leaders, Ante Trumbić and especially Frano Supilo (both eth-
nic Croats), were suspicious of Pašić's tactics. Already at the very beginning of the 
war Trumbić and Supilo had taken a firm stance on how the South Slavic emigrees 
"should act in accord with Serbia, but not in its name" (Šepić, 1958: 263). They belie-
ved that a South Slavic state was to be grounded in the right of self-determination, 
and thus that a future joint state had to be created by an agreement between the 
Committee and the Serbian government, where the Committee would represent the 
South Slavs from Austria-Hungary (Supilo, 1970: 464). Thus, by the end of 1915 
the Croatian members of the Committee, and especially its leaders Ante Trumbić 
and Frano Supilo, sought to influence the Entente leaders and public opinion that 
a Yugoslav state might be impossible to achieve if the Treaty of London was imple-
mented.
The subsequent distrust of the Committee in the Serbian policy grew by autumn 
1915 when the Entente powers pressed Serbia to hand over Macedonia to Bulgaria 
as a part of the Entente's effort to push Bulgaria away from its alliance with the 
Central Powers. Although Great Britain, France and Russia offered Serbia the terri-
torial concessions at the expense of the Habsburg Monarchy – and even promised 
further support for uniting the South Slavs – if Serbia gave up Macedonia to Bulga-
8 Serbia was also strongly opposed the London Treaty, since it went against the creation of a 
South Slavic state, which was seen as a means to unleash the pan-Serb unification. Moreover, 
the Treaty was exclusively concluded among Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy who did 
not consult Serbia about its content. Besides, the territories promised to Serbia did not meet 
its demands on the annexation of all territories of Austria-Hungary populated by the Serb 

























ria, Pašić replied, "We shall choose Macedonia" (Djokic, 2010: 44-45). The Commi-
ttee was kept entirely in the dark about the negotiations, so when word leaked out, 
the Committee was angry. Namely, Pašić was convincing Trumbić and Supilo that 
the Serbian government would submit to the Entente demand "but only under one 
condition – that the Entente adopted the program of the South Slav unity against 
Austria-Hungary" (Boban et al., 1976: 206). Although the whole problem disappea-
red after Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915, the Committee felt 
betrayed by Pašić. The notion of betrayal was even more emphasized when Supilo 
found out that in June 1915, Serbia submitted to the Russian foreign ministry a 
memorandum written much in a style expressing Serbian supremacy over Croats 
and Slovenes. The memorandum claimed that the Serbs and the Croats were one 
people by Serb colonization and linguistic assimilation of the Croatian lands, and 
subsequently depicted the role of Serbia as the Piedmont of the South Slavs. Thus, 
the memorandum claimed that Austro-Hungarian South Slavs could play only a pa-
ssive role in the struggle for unification (Šepić, 1960: 484-497). The whole situation 
made Frano Supilo become so emotional that he advocated the Committee to lead 
henceforth a policy entirely independent of Serbia, and even to break relations with 
the Serbian government (Šepić, 1970: 146; Lampe, 2000: 104).
Frano Supilo was the staunchest advocate of the policy that a future common 
state had to be a product of an agreement between the Committee and Serbian go-
vernment. Thus, in October 1914 he clearly stated to Pašić that Croats should "lead 
the unification process in the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs . . . while Serbia would 
do the same outside of the Habsburg Monarchy" (Šepić, 1967: 9). While all mem-
bers of the Committee were concerned primarily with winning over the sympathies 
of the Entente powers for the cause of the South Slav unification, Supilo was also 
equally concerned with the prospective position of Croatia in the future South Slav 
state. The feeling that the territories considered to be Croatian were used in an illicit 
bargain between Italy, Serbia and Hungary (Šepić, 1961: 149-153) made Supilo be-
have in agreement with behavioral game theory predictions; he reacted emotionally 
to the unfair offer and turned it down even though the break with Serbia would 
further undermine the cause of the South Slav unification. Namely, he felt that the 
Croats were (ab)used by Serbia as a "pure compensation for the sacrifice Serbia wo-
uld be exposed to in respect of ceding Macedonia to Bulgarians" (Supilo, 1970: 493). 
Moreover, the reaction also contained a dose of moral superiority developed as a 
reaction to what was perceived as a highly unfair proposal. In a letter to the member 
of the Committee and his close friend Ivo de Giullio, Supilo expressed his outrage at 
how Serbian Prime Minister Pašić could even have the idea to choose the "desert of 
Bregalnica" [Macedonia] with respect to "Croatia, the center of culture, civilization 
and politics of the western part of our people." By the same token, he aired his long 
suppressed frustration with the Serbian policy, stating that Croatia, as a Catholic co-
untry had been a part of "one such colossal and humanitarian culture . . . in respect 
to the whole orthodoxy had been one pale copy, which had to compensate its cultu-
ral sterility by borrowing from the Protestantism" (Supilo, 1970: 503).9 Eventually, 
9 Both of the Committee leaders, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, were originally proponents of 
the Party of Right. The Party opposed idea that Croats and Serbs belonged to one and the same 
nation, and moreover, developed a notion of moral superiority of the Croats as more civilized 
with respect to the more backward Serbs. Although they eventually embraced the Yugoslav 
ideology, their political minds were still partially framed by the legacy of the Party of Right, 


































































Supilo left the Committee in June 1916 since he failed to persuade its members to 
demand the negotiations with the Serbian government on equal footing.
Although Ante Trumbić and other Croat members of the Committee did share 
Supilo's concerns, they did not want to risk an open break with the Serbian govern-
ment. They believed that Serbia still presented the central agent of future unification 
of South Slavs, which would prevent the division of the Croatian lands among Italy, 
Hungary and Serbia itself (Šepić, 1970: 162). Serbia's military defeats of the autumn 
of 1915 subsequently jeopardized the prospects for creating the South Slavic state.
However, the visit by Serbian Prince-Regent Aleksandar to London in the 
spring of 1916 bolstered the hopes of the Committee that Serbia's preference for the 
South Slavic unification would not entirely disappear. Namely, the Prince-Regent 
publicly emphasized that Serbia would not give up the war aims proclaimed in 1914, 
i.e., that the creation of the South Slavic state remains the primary war aim of Serbia 
(Boban et al., 1976: 280). Moreover, in a private conversation with Ivan Meštrović, 
Aleksandar praised the Committee's platform and criticized the "Serbian exclusi-
vism" advocated by "some members of the government", and eventually stated his 
dedication "to become a king of Yugoslavia, or nothing" (Meštrović, 1993: 82-83).10 
The Prince-Regent's performance during his 1916 visit to London strengthened the 
hopes of the Committee in Aleksandar "who they regard as entirely devoted to their 
cause" (Boban et al., 1976: 308). Subsequently, it announced the course of the Prin-
ce-Regent's successive role, which would turn out to be of a highest importance in 
the final stage of the South Slavic unification in 1918 (see section six).
5. Behavioral Version 2: P2 and R (1917)
The year 1917 represents a new twist in the game between the Serbian Premier Ni-
kola Pašić (P) and the Yugoslav Committee (R). This time P became emotional since 
he was exposed to extreme pressure. The pressure originated from international po-
litics as well as from Serbian internal affairs.
However, 1917 was not easy for the Committee either. Namely, the reforms that 
were announced by the new Austro-Hungarian Emperor Charles (who succeeded 
old Emperor Francis Joseph, who died in November 1916) gave a hopeful boost to 
the politicians of the small nations in the Monarchy that their national problems 
would finally be solved (Judson, 2016: 418-423). The South Slav representatives in 
the Austrian diet took the opportunity to proclaim in May 1917 a manifesto calling 
for the union of the South Slavic provinces in the Monarchy. The Manifesto, called 
a May Declaration, left the Committee in a predicament: it claimed to speak for the 
South Slavs in the Monarchy, and now they were speaking quite openly for them-
selves (Pavlowitch, 2003: 33). However, the relation between the Committee and 
should center on Croatia. However, Supilo never gave up the Yugoslav idea but only eventually 
advocated that Serbs and the respective Croats should have their own states until some future 
generations would bring "agreement, compromise, respecting each other rights and traditi-
ons" (Supilo, 1970: 494).
10 Meštrović established his reputation as the Croat sculptor with figures taken from Serbian 
history and folk tradition, since the legacy of the heroic Serb struggle against the Ottomans 
was prospected to be the core of the future Yugoslav identity. He was very well acquainted 
with the Serbian royal family since he exhibited his sculptures for the Serbian Pavilion at the 
1911 Rome International Exhibition. On the eve of the war, he occasionally traveled to Serbia 
to sculpt the royal family. For good overview on Meštrović's artisan and political activities in 

























the country soon stabilized since the German influence in the Monarchy and the 
Hungarian resistance to the reforms caused the announced reforms to fail to a great 
extent (Judson, 2016: 418-423; Cornwall, 2011). Thus, in August 1917, the south 
Slavic politicians in Austro-Hungary used secret ties to confirm their support of the 
Committee's policy and to send a message that the May Declaration should be con-
sidered to be one further step towards the goal of uniting with Serbia (Šepić, 1970: 
230-238; Meštrović, 1993: 87-89; Jovanović Pižon, 2015: 335).
The situation was extremely difficult for Pašić due to several international poli-
tical aspects. After the Russian Czar was dethroned in March 1917, Serbia remained 
without its foreign policy patron. Moreover, the new Russian bourgeoisie govern-
ment – together with the US – became the firmest advocate of a national self-de-
termination principle. Simultaneously, the new Austro- Hungarian emperor, Char-
les, started to seek a separate peace with the Entente powers and the United States 
(who joined the war in April 1917). So, the prospect of the dismemberment of Au-
stria-Hungary became even worse than before, seriously threatening to ultimately 
leave Serbia empty-handed (Pavlowitch, 2003: 31-32).
Simultaneously, the fact that the whole Serbian elite had to withdraw to Greece 
in exile brought turmoil to Serbia's party politics. The Serbian Radical Party headed 
by Nikola Pašić split in the course of 1916, after which a certain number of its MPs 
dissented and joined the opposition. This forced Pašić to form a new coalition ca-
binet with the opposition. There are indications that the Prince-Regent Aleksandar 
– a strong proponent of the South Slavic cause – considered at some point to re-
move Pašić from the post.11 However, in mid-1917 Aleksandar desperately needed 
Pašić's support in fighting the group of army officers known as Black Hand, which 
seriously threatened both Aleksandar's as well as Pašić's positions (Mitrović, 2007: 
180-185).12
To ensure some stability to his position, Pašić found it useful to resolve the con-
flict with the Yugoslav Committee.13 Simultaneously, the Committee saw the agree-
ment with Pašić as a means to regain its initiative with respect to the active role that 
the politicians in the Monarchy assumed with the May Declaration (Banac, 1992: 
123-124). Thus, the delegates of the Committee and the Serbian government gat-
hered in Corfu in June 1917 to draw up a program that would define the internal 
11 The prominent member of the Radical Party and the minister in Pašić's government, Miša 
Trifunović, told in the late 1930s to Trumbić's close acquittance how in 1917 Aleksandar con-
spired against Pašić in a way to eventually remove him from the post (Matković and Trogrlić, 
2019: 418-419). The Serbian ambassador to the Great Britain Jovan Jovanović Pižon already 
in October 1916 wrote in his diary about the tense relations between the government and the 
Prince-Regent (Jovanović Pižon, 2015: 196).
12 The Black Hand was a secret military society organised by a group of Serbian army officers 
in 1901. The society was formed with the aim of uniting all Serbs and the South Slavs respe-
ctively by all means, including terrorist actions. It gained a reputation for its involvement in 
the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. During the war, the Black 
Hand thought that Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, as well as Prince-Regent Aleksandar, did not 
act aggressively enough towards the Pan-Serb cause. For a good overview on the Black Hand, 
see Bataković, 2006.
13 According to Jovanović Pižon, just beforehand the Corfu meeting started, the opposition and 
anti-Pašić faction of the Radical Party were putting effort to force Pašić to step down from 
the post, and to replace him with the then speaker of the Serbian Parliament Andra Nikolić, 



































































arrangement of the future joint state, including both its name and the constitutional 
arrangement.
The two delegations had different views concerning the institutional design of 
the future state. While the head of the Committee's delegation and its president 
Ante Trumbić was very keen to protect the interests of Croatia as a historical land 
with autonomous rights, most of the members of the Committee delegation – the 
Croats included – were much more open to the arrangement, which would include 
a strong central government. Simultaneously, delegates from the Serbian opposi-
tion inclined to meet the Committee's expectation that the new state should not 
represent a mere extension of Serbia's authorities to the Austro-Hungarian South 
Slavic provinces (Janković, 1967: 228-263). According to the memoirs of the com-
mittee delegates (Slovene Bogomil Vošnjak and of the Croat Hinko Hinković), even 
the prominent radical leaders such as Stojan Protić and the speaker of the Serbian 
parliament Andra Nikolić had an ear for the Committee's claims much more than 
the prime minister Pašić had (Vošnjak, 1928: 241-242; Hinković, 1927: 285-286). 
Shortly after the end of the conference, Andra Nikolić and another Serb delegate at 
the conference, the prominent leader of the opposition Milorad Drašković, compla-
ined to Ivan Meštrović about how Pašić almost caused negotiations to fail. In con-
trast, both Drašković and Nikolić praised Trumbić as an actor who showed modesty, 
a sense for compromise and "sincere dedication to the unification of the South Slavs" 
(Meštrović, 1993: 67-70).
There were two issues where Pašić's reaction had almost brought the negotia-
tions to failure. The first one was related to existing autonomy of the South Slavic 
provinces in Austria-Hungary, while the second one was related to how the Consti-
tution of the new state should be declared.
With respect to the provinces' autonomy, Trumbić was very vocal on how the 
Croatian autonomy should be preserved in the new South Slavic state since it "pre-
sented a shield to defend Croatia from the foreign power. That autonomy created 
one life, which nothing on earth can destroy. That mentality stands for one agent, 
with which unification can only be done by agreement" (Krfska konferencija, 1924: 
55). Trumbić's arguments raised heated debate, where his claims were contested by 
almost all delegates who saw in provincial autonomies "arcane legalistic subterfuges 
. . . that would weaken the unified state." (Pavlowitch, 2003: 33). However, most 
Serbian delegates at least understood the importance of this autonomy for Croatian 
nation-building (Krfska konferencija, 1924: 67).
In contrast to the Serbian opposition, Pašić confronted Trumbić by stating that 
"the Serbs outside Serbia want to associate with Serbia, even if it is a Pyrrhic victory. 
The national feeling is more developed among Serbs than among Croats. Hence, 
Serbia is taken as a center of unification. . . . The liberty of one people cannot come 
to terms with the concept of historical right. As a democratic nation, we do not re-
cognize these rights" (Krfska konferencija, 1924: 58).14 According to Dragoslav Jan-
ković, who wrote most extensively on the 1917 Corfu Conference, Pašić threatened 
the creation of a Greater Serbia if Trumbić continued to insist on the autonomy for 
Croats within the future state (Janković, 1967: 239-240). This would be the payoff 
presented by the right branch in Figure 2. Serbia's payoff of 3 (which is lower than 8, 
14 Pašić formulated this in colloquial Serbian "Srbi hoće da se ujedine sa Srbijom, makar suvog 


























left branch) not only because a Greater Serbia would be smaller than Yugoslavia, but 
also because the territorial expansion of Serbia – as stipulated by the 1915 Treaty of 
London – would hardly be possible, given the 1917 war situation.
Even if we take Janković's claim as overexaggerated, Pašić's words reflected his 
conviction that he had a sort of moral right to exclusively frame the offer's substance. 
Moreover, his notion of right was anchored in the feeling of Serb superiority, as can 
be seen from Pašić's words. This feeling of Serb superiority emerged again later in 
the course of proceedings, when Pašić warned Trumbić that "if you would insist on 
some illusionary historical rights, the idea of unification would weaken inevitably. 
. . . If we sacrificed everything to that idea, you should sacrifice something" (Krfska 
konferencija, 1924: 93). This sacrifice was referred to the burden that Serbia took 
over in the course of the war.
The second issue radicalized Pašić's hawkish behavior, thus almost entirely hal-
ting the negotiations. Discussing the issue of the majority in favor of the future con-
stitution, some Serb delegates as well as some delegates from the Committee, propo-
sed that the future constitution should be supported by a qualified majority of seats 
in the future constitutional assembly. The proposal on qualified majority was seen as 
one bringing about the consent of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to a new constitution, 
as was elaborated by the prominent member of the Serbian opposition, Vojislav Ma-
rinković (Krfska konferencija, 1924: 123). All delegates expressed consent, except 
Pašić who raised suspicions about the principle of the qualified majority because it 
could block efficient decision-making in the Assembly (Ibid.: 124). However, Pašić 
eventually lost his temper when Trumbić argued that the qualified majority should 
be supported by 'tribal majority'. Namely, Trumbić claimed that the future constitu-
tion should also be supported by each of the separate majorities of the Serb, Croat 
and Slovene deputies; otherwise, the Croats and the Slovenes could be outvoted by 
the Serb majority. He went on: "Our common state should be the synthesis of all our 
tribes [nations], and no tribe should dominate over the others" (Ibid.: 128).
Pašić again reacted furiously to Trumbić's words stating that "if we decide for 
a federal tribal state . . . then we should clear up in the first place if we are to create 
our common state or not" (ibid.: 130). According to what Milorad Drašković and 
Andra Nikolić said to Ivan Meštrović, Pašić was stubbornly insisting that the future 
constitution be supported by a simple majority, and he gave his support to the quali-
fied majority only after his closest associate Stojan Protić persuaded him to comply. 
Andra Nikolić also complained to Meštrović that Pašić behaved very obdurately to 
Trumbić during the conference (Meštrović, 1993: 67-69).
Pašić's behavior was determined by his belief that Trumbić and the Yugoslav 
Committee were not worthy of anything better than his proposal. This became appa-
rent when Trumbić stressed that the South Slav unification should be advocated to 
the Allies with more vigour (Krfska konferencija, 1924: 152-153). Pašić responded 
to Trumbić that pressing the Allies to support officially the South Slavic unification 
would mean going officially against the 1915 Treaty of London, which at this stage of 
the war could be counterproductive to the cause of South Slavic unification. Howe-
ver, he did not miss to add that "those who fight and sacrifice are the ones called 
to solve the problems" (ibid.:154). While no delegate questioned that the Serbian 
government should have a major role in the policy of the South Slavic unification, 
some delegates of the Committee and of the Serbian opposition became very vocal 
on how the Committee should at least be entirely informed on the government's 


































































shout: We want to unite with Serbia! And don't worry about anything else" (ibid.: 
160). Pašić's words reflected his long-standing belief that the Committee could not 
represent an equal partner in the South Slavic unification project. This attitude was 
even strengthened during the war since Pašić and his Serbian Radical Party develo-
ped a certain ressentiment vis-à-vis the Committee because of the bad experience 
with Supilo. Pašić himself revealed this frustration when in the course of the procee-
dings he said that Supilo greatly damaged the cause of South Slavic unification by 
"prescribing to himself a role of politician," instead of "going around and speaking 
for a unification, as a Croat" (ibid., 100).
Pašić's hawkish behavior could have prospectively led to the breakdown of ne-
gotiations, which could have been costly for Serbia but also for Pašić personally. 
Since the Prince-Regent Aleksandar was committed to South Slavic unification, it 
was expected that he would not accept any failure of the negotiations caused by the 
hawkish Pašić, or by any other agent. The Corfu meeting ended with the adoption 
of the Corfu Declaration, which was a middle ground between the Croatian and 
the respective Serb ideas on the future South Slavic state. Although the Declaration 
proclaimed the new state to be a constitutional parliamentary monarchy headed by 
the Serbian dynasty of Karađorđević, it also stated that the constitutional assembly 
should pass a constitution by a "numerically qualified majority" (Šišić, 1920: 99), 
thus giving a guarantee that the Croats and Slovenes would not be outvoted by nu-
merous Serbs.
6. Rational Choice Version: Typical P and Typical R (1918)
The very last stage of the war in 1918 made P and R play according to the classical 
version of the rational choice model (see introduction). However, the events made 
both the Yugoslav Committee and the Pašić-led cabinet irrelevant for the game's 
last stage. Instead, the new P and R were introduced into the game. These were 
the Serbian Prince-Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević (P) and the Council made up 
of the South Slavs leaders from Austria-Hungary who organized themselves in a 
provisional state (R). Namely, by the late summer 1918 the Habsburg Monarchy's 
central authorities were in the process of the rapid disintegration. As a response, the 
ethnic liberation movements in the Monarchy started to organize their own parallel 
state administrations. The Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian political leaders from 
Austria-Hungary declared in October 1918 the State of the Slovenes, Croats and 
Serbs (hereafter the State of SCS; not to be confused with the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes that was declared on 1st December 1918, when the war was 
over). Its major representative and executive body was the National Council residing 
in Zagreb. Although the State of SCS was designed as a provisional polity with the 
purpose of serving the unification of Austro-Hungarian South Slavs with Serbia, it 
turned into an organized political authority, which could not be entirely ignored 
(Dragnich, 1974: 120).15
By 1st November 1918 the Serbian troops liberated the entire territory of Ser-
bia. On 3rd November 1918 the Allies signed an armistice with Austria-Hungary, 
which made Italy immediately start to occupy the territories promised by the 1915 
Treaty of London. The attempts of the National Council to assemble any armed for-
ces completely failed, while law and order in the State of SCS were breaking down 


























fast. Thus, the National Council demanded the Serbian troops to advance as much 
as they could onto the territory of the State of SCS to maintain law and order and 
to prevent the Italian occupation of the east Adriatic coast (Krizman, 1989: 329-
330). Since only several Serbian ministers and members of parliament were back in 
Belgrade from exile in Greece, the Prince-Regent Aleksandar, acting as a supreme 
commander of the army, took a leading role (Banac, 1992: 138),16 thus becoming the 
P for this stage of the game.
Simultaneously, the National Council (R) was split into two camps. One camp 
insisted on a proper legal framework for unification. The second camp preferred 
a rapid and unconditional unification with the Kingdom of Serbia. While the first 
camp was made up of the Croatian politicians, the second camp was mostly com-
posed of the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia, and of the non-Serbs who were at 
the forefront of the Italian occupation – Croats from the eastern Adriatic coast and 
the Slovenes (Pavlowitch, 2003: 38). When the leaders of the first camp asked the 
Serbian authorities about the recognition of the State of SCS as the step preceding 
the unification, they got the immediate response that the armistice signed with Au-
stria-Hungary authorized Serbia to occupy the territories populated by ethnic Serbs, 
and thus "that Serbia could not recognize any state, which would encompass the 
compatriots Serbia fought for" (Krizman, 1977: 190). By late November, the territo-
ries of today's Vojvodina declared unification with Serbia. The Dalmatian provincial 
council submitted an ultimatum to the National Council to decide on the unificati-
on as soon as possible. Otherwise, Dalmatia alone would proclaim unification with 
Serbia. Similar demands were coming from dozens of local authorities in eastern 
Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ibid.: 206-208).
The November and December 1918 events led R to accept the offer made by 
P under which it was rather disadvantaged. To prevent the territory the State of 
SCS from being partitioned between Italy and Serbia, the National Council sent a 
delegation to Belgrade on 22 November 1918 with a set of instructions to condu-
ct the negotiations about the unification. While the delegates were talking to Ser-
bia's representatives, they received news that dozens of districts in the State of SCS 
independently proclaimed the unification with Serbia paying no attention to the 
National Council in Zagreb. These demands made the National Council delegates 
to abandon the instructions and to accept a kind of unification dictated by the Prin-
ce-Regent. Finally, on 1st December 1918 the delegation submitted to Prince-Regent 
Aleksandar the document declaring an unconditional preparedness to unite with 
Serbia (Krizman, 1977: 222-228). In his reply, Aleksandar proclaimed "the unifi-
cation of Serbia with the territories of independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and 
Serbs into a united Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" (Šišić, 1920: 282). Since 
Aleksandar did not proclaim unification of the two states, but rather the unification 
of one state with particular lands, his proclamation had the legal form of a unila-
teral announcement of the formation of the new kingdom, rather than an act of 
unification of two equal partners (Matković, 2006: 86). Eventually, the combination 
of external and internal pressures left the National Council with no choice but to 
accept an unconditional unification with Serbia in a 'take it or leave it' form. Simul-
16 In September 1918 the Prince-Regent was officially promoted to the rank of Supreme General 
of the Serbian Army, while in October Aleksandar sent a dispatch to the Serbian ambassador 
to the Great Britain Jovan Jovanović Pižon asking him for information about the English 
stance towards the South Slavic unification by giving command to Serbian army to advance 


































































taneously, Serbia, as a war victor, got itself a seat at the international table – namely, 
the 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference, where the South Slavic state was eventually 
internationally recognized (Pavlowitch, 2003: 38).
7. Conclusion
Game theory offers a wonderful toolkit to analyze collective strategic interactions. 
Yet, sometimes the reality is far more complex, and a game theoretic model, which 
is essentially a Weberian ideal type, does not necessarily reflect all the details and 
complexities of real life. One single game, while it lasts, can have many twists and 
turns and, consequently, many subvariants. Most games can, therefore, be broken 
down into several sub-games, each of which represents a complex reality. We hope 
to have demonstrated that the ultimatum game can be such a game.
In general, negotiations may reflect the initial idea of the rational choice theory 
that P will give an ultimatum to R expecting them to accept it. However, both R and 
P can diverge from the rational choice predictions, as the game unfolds. Drawing on 
the more recent theoretical findings from the behavioral game theory, we introduce 
emotions and values, thus identifying three different versions of the ultimatum game: 
the first, which reflects the rational choice version of the game (P expects R to accept 
whatever offer in the hope that something is better than nothing); the second, in which 
R acts emotionally, thus rejecting unfair offers; and the third, in which P acts emotio-
nally as a consequence of the belief that P has a superior status of which R is not worthy.
To test all three variants of ultimatum game, we applied them to the negotiati-
ons between the Serbian government and the representatives of Slovenes, Croats, 
and Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy during 1914-1918. Though the game ended 
up as a typical rational choice version of the ultimatum game (the Serbs gave a 'take 
it or leave it' offer to the South Slav representatives from the Habsburg Monarchy, 
which they eventually accepted), we showed that, at some point, both R and P acted 
emotionally and behaved contrary to what the rational choice theory predicts.
Is our explanation applicable beyond this historical example? In the introdu-
ctory section, we claimed that our model has excessive explanatory power (Elster, 
2015). In other words, we do not only claim that ultimatum game is valid to explain 
the creation of the first Yugoslavia in 1914-1918, but also to some other historical 
and more recent political events from the post-communist East European and Yu-
goslav history. Thus, we use the approach, embraced by Febvre, Braudel, and some 
Balkan historians, that the past and the present are interconnected and that the past 
can be useful to understand some more recent events (Stojanović, 2008; 2010).
The applicability of the rational choice form of ultimatum game (version 1) has 
already found wide applicability, especially in the economic literature (Mankiw, 
2020). We claim that versions 2 and 3, although less used in explaining the real 
events, do have its applicability beyond the example we discussed in this paper. We 
believe that its explanatory strength can be tested by applying it to the post-com-
munist transition in Eastern Europe after 1989, and especially after 2010, when the 
concept of the post-communist reform began to crumble. The fact that in some 
post-communist countries, such as Russia, Hungary, Poland, and some Western 
Balkan countries, the electorate eventually rejected the neoliberal concept of reform 
as an unfair offer, as suggested by Krastev & Holmes (2019) and Ghodsee & Oren-
stein (2021), indicates that behavioral version of ultimatum game could find appli-

























Version 3, where proposers are emotional and are prepared to insist on an unfair 
offer at the cost of themselves, could be found in the recent Yugoslav history, during 
the early phase of the communist Yugoslavia disintegration process in 1988-1989. 
Vladimir Gligorov discussed the breakup of Yugoslavia from the game theory per-
spective but used different games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Chain 
Store Paradox (Gligorov, 1994). We believe it would be fruitful, from the academic 
point of view, to look at the same problem by applying the variants of ultimatum 
game.
Our article provides modest, but still important contribution to the Yugoslav 
historiography. Our interpretation emphasizes, more than previous literature on 
the subject, an uncertain position of the Serbian Prime-Minister Nikola Pašić due 
to his clash with the Prince–Regent Aleksandar in the mid-1917. Game theory is 
effective in underlining this kind of relationship. Secondly, since our article partly 
belongs to the humanities, the application of game theory actually offers a new kind 
of interpretation of the 1914-1918 events. And in the humanities, interpretation is a 
form of explanation (Elster, 2015). In this sense, the very fact that we construed the 
negotiations as a game between two or more agents offers to historiography a kind 
of novel fact that can change our understanding of the past events but can also help 
us explain some subsequent events and processes (like the breakup of Yugoslavia 70 
years later). Such approach to history is in line with Lefebvre's and Braudel's under-
standing of historiography under which it cannot be reduced to a mere collection 
and exposition of facts. Rather, it should tell us something about the present. The de-
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Tri verzije igre ultimatuma: primjer iz povijesti stvaranja 
Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914-1918
Sažetak U članku se analizira stvaranje Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914-
1918 kao oblik igre ultimatuma. rad pokazuje kako se pregovori između Vlade 
Kraljevine Srbije i Jugoslavenskog odbora oko stvaranja zajedničke južnoslavenske 
države odvijaju putem triju verzija igre ultimatuma. Prva verzija je standardni mo-
del racionalnog izbora, gdje Primatelj prihvaća svaku ponudu koju nudi Ponuditelj. 
Druga verzija je primjer bihevioralne igre ultimatuma, gdje nekorektna ponuda Po-
nuditelja izaziva odbijanje od strane Primatelja pod cijenu štete koju trpi Primatelj. 
Članak pokazuje tu vrstu ponašanja na primjeru djelovanja frane Supila, jednoga 
od vođa Jugoslavenskog odbora. Treća verzija je primjer bihevioralne igre ultima-
tuma gdje ponuditelj inzistira na ponudi koje može ići na njegovu štetu. ona se 
može uočiti u ponašanju srbijanskog premijera nikole Pašića koji se usprotivio bilo 
kakvim ustupcima Jugoslavenskom odboru, dajući tako ultimatum hrvatskoj strani 
da prihvati srpsku ponudu ili ostane bez ičega, što bi bilo štetno i za srpsku stranu. 
ovaj primjer je važan jer upućuje na dva zaključka. Prvo, povijesne igre često su 
mješavina nekoliko verzija. Drugo, Ponuditelj također može imati emocionalnu re-
akciju i dati ponudu kojom može našteti sebi. ovaj se aspekt igre ultimatuma manje 
spominje jer ga je teško simulirati u eksperimentima.
Ključne riječi igra ultimatuma, emocije, racionalni izbor, Jugoslavenski odbor, Srp-
ska vlada, Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
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